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Phishing is a form of online identity theft that aims 
to steal sensitive information such as 
online banking passwords and credit card information 
from users. Data is key for the digital economy, but 
disclosing personal data online increases 
vulnerabilities and the likelihood of experiencing 
negative consequences from disclosure. In this paper, 
we analyze willingness to share personal data, a 
preference for an intuitive decision style and 
susceptibility to phishes. We report the results of three 
large-scale national studies in Norway that included the 
cognitive reflection test (CRT) and a choice experiment 
on willingness to share personal data. With a binary 
logistic regression method, we analyzed the relationship 
between the CRT, willingness to share data and 
demographical variables with susceptibility to phishes 
as the outcome variable. Our main finding is that the 
willingness to share personal data and an intuitive 
thinking style significantly predict the probability of 
falling for phish. These results are based on three large-
scale studies with national populations, in contrast to 
earlier studies that in most cases relying on student 
populations, giving them greater validity. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Phishing is a confidence trick aimed at getting 
unsuspecting people to give away personal details on the 
internet so that the perpetrator can make fraudulent use 
of their credentials [1], [2]. Often, phishing attacks are 
very sophisticated so that even well-educated and 
cautions internet users are liable to fall for phishing. 
Many internet users have a tendency towards privacy-
compromising behavior, revealing a divergence 
between privacy attitudes and actual behavior [3], [4]. 
According to Nicholson et al. [5] phishing is an example 
where users are overconfident. Other factors are 
inattention, optimism biases, lack of rational behavior, 
limited mental resources and other “biases and 
heuristics - well known to behavioral researchers” 
(Acquisti et al. 2017: 32, [6]). Our study targeted a 
national population by recruiting participants through 
two professional market research companies. The study 
included questions about phishing and misuse of 
personal data and a choice experiment on sharing of 
personal data. The Cognitive Reflection Test [7] was 
used as a measure of individuals’ ability to suppress 
intuitive and spontaneous wrong answers in favor of 
correct answers requiring greater reflection. According 
to Toplak et al. [8], the CRT has the capacity to function 
as a unique predictor of performance on a number of 
heuristics-and-biases tasks. 
 
2. Related work and motivation for the 
research 
 
Ferreira & Vieira-Marques [9] give an overview of 
ten years of phishing research based on 605 scientific 
journal abstracts. They conclude that there is no single 
solution for the phishing threat and, for future research, 
call for a “focus on socio-technical and integrated 
solutions that can reflect a comprehensive 
understanding of both human computer interaction and 
user unique characteristics” (our emphasis). 
Addressing this need to assess user unique 
characteristics was a main motivation for this research. 
According to Volkamer et al. [10] and the APWG 
Internet Policy Committee Global Phishing Survey it 
takes, on average, 28.75 hours to detect new phishing 
websites. Users are mostly unprotected from phishing 
until malicious websites are identified and blocked [11]. 
To avoid phishing during this period, users have to 
reflect on whether to go along with what they are being 
asked to do (for a phish to work), rather than simply 
complying. This motivates our research into 
intuitiveness (automatic decision-making behavior) 
versus reflective problem-solving styles in relation to 
the tendency to fall for phishing and willingness to share 
personal data, and why we chose to include a version of 
the CRT.  
 
2.1. The Cognitive Reflection Test, phishing 
studies and sharing of personal data 






The CRT is often thought of as measuring “people’s 
tendency to answer questions with the first idea that 
comes to their mind without checking it” (Kahneman, 
2011:65, [12]. This has been attributed to a tendency 
towards “miserly” information processing, to 
impulsively accept the solution to a problem that 
involves expending a minimum of cognitive effort [8], 
[13]. To score highly on the CRT, the respondent needs 
to reflect on and question their initial intuitive responses 
[14], [15] and this involves cognitive effort. This 
corresponds to the personal tendency not to rely on 
intuition (which is fast), rather than analytical reasoning 
(which takes longer).  
Bialek & Pennycook [16] discuss whether or not the 
cognitive reflection test is robust to multiple exposures. 
They suggest that it is and write that “…participants 
who do poorly on the CRT massively overestimate their 
performance (i.e., they do not realize they are doing 
poorly; Pennycook et al., 2017), indicating that intuitive 
individuals may have a metacognitive disadvantage (see 
also Mata et al., 2013)” [17]. 
It could be argued that low scores on the CRT simply 
reflect low mathematical skill or general cognitive 
ability. But while these factors may influence their 
scores somewhat, they do not explain them completely 
[18], [19], [20], [8], [13]. The CRT aims to cue 
intuitions that are common across people and lead to 
potential responses from nearly all test-takers. 
Differences in scores can then be taken to reflect an 
individual’s tendency towards reflective versus intuitive 
thinking. We suggest that the CRT is relevant for 
phishing research, since in a phishing context a fast and 
intuitive response style might be expected to correlate 
with higher vulnerability. 
Several studies have used the CRT in relation to 
phishing susceptibility, though not with national 
populations. Kumaraguru et al. [21] in a study with 42 
students in a lab experiment, found the low CRT score 
group had a higher probability of clicking on the 
phishing-no-account e-mails than those in the high CRT 
score group, 0.39 versus 0.04, respectively. In their 
study with the classic three-items CRT, a CRT score of 
0-1 (all wrong or one correct) was coded as the “low 
CRT group” and 2-3 (two or all correct) as the “high 
CRT group.”  
 Butavicius et al. [22] performed a phishing study 
with 121 students. These researchers found a significant 
negative correlation between CRT scores and link safety 
judgments for spear-phishing (ρ < -.23, p < .014, N = 
112) and phishing (ρ < -.3, p < .001, N = 112) emails, 
but no significant correlation between performance on 
the CRT and link safety judgments on genuine emails (ρ 
< -.01, p < .973, N = 114). Petraityte et al. [23] recruited 
100 participants consisting of university students, 
lecturers and staff, and asked them to assess QR-codes. 
They found that less impulsive people who did not know 
what the purpose of the test was (those with a higher 
CRT score) responded better. Participants with higher 
CRT scores were less likely to click on the URL held 
inside the fake QR code. Cognitive impulsivity did not 
reveal any significant difference for the participants who 
were informed what the study was about. Finally, in a 
study by Jones et al. [24] with 224 university students 
and staff, the participants were asked to examine 36 
emails (18 legitimate and 18 phishing emails). Although 
the analysis of the data primarily indicated that 
participants who demonstrated higher sensation seeking 
were poor at discriminating between phishing and 
legitimate stimuli, the authors write that “Performance 
on the CRT also predicted susceptibility”. 
A further motivation for our work was the tendency 
that many have of sharing of personal data when they do 
not have to. In the digital economy, we pay with our data 
[25], [26], [27]. For many applications, we have to give 
consent to sharing, but not always. All Internet-users 
can be targeted by phishing, and requests for sharing of 
data generally. We therefore chose to use national 
population samples rather than convenience samples or 
a sample with students only.  
 
3. Research method  
 
We carried out three surveys in Norway in 
cooperation with two different market research 
companies, to achieve our aim of national studies on an 
issue affecting a broad section of the population. The 
three surveys included questions from the Eurostat-
survey about credit cards and misuse of data [28]. The 
formulation of these questions was discussed with the 
national bureau of statistics in Norway. This means that 
the findings in our studies, the demographical profile 
and the number that reported falling for phish can be 
compared to statistical data published by the national 
bureau of statistics.  
The Cognitive Reflection Test was used to assess 
participants thinking styles, intuitive versus analytical. 
While in some countries many in the general public 
know with the correct answers to the CRT [29] the CRT 
has, as far as we know, not been used in a national, 
large-scale survey in Norway before. We also designed 
a behavioral measure concerning disclosure of personal 
data and demographics. We asked the participants for 
consent, to give us access to all the data about the 
participant that the market research company already 
had. Since the market research company was the data-
processor, and we did not actually receive the data, we 
did not need ethical approval for the studies. 
For the sample sizes we used the Eurostat-stat 
cybersecurity 2017 survey [28] as an indication. In this 
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survey, 8 percent answered that they had experienced 
identity theft, that is someone stealing personal data and 
impersonating the person. On the basis of this we set a 
target of at least 100 respondents in each study who have 
experienced phishing.  
The participants were recruited from two panels, 
citizens that are 18 years to 79 years in study 1 and 16 
to 69 years in study 2 and 3. In total, study 1 had 1340 
respondents 18 – 79 years old, and 1148 with the age 18 
to 69. In study 2 there were in total 1405 individuals 
aged 16 to 69 years, and in study 3 1290 individuals. We 
excluded the 70 plus age group from study 1 in order to 
have a more similar age-profile for the three studies. The 
study 2 and the 3 participants were recruited from the 
same panel, but none of the study 2 participants were 
invited to participate in study 3.  
 
3.1. Participants, the survey format and 
measurements 
 
The participants received an email and answered the 
web-based survey on a PC or smart-phone, which took 
10-15 minutes. For the CRT , with used the open format 
in study 1. In study 2, 50% received the open format, 
and 50% the multiple-choice format for the three CRT-
items. In study 3, 75% received the open format, and 
25% the multiple-choice format for the three CRT-
items. The scores on the CRT [7] are reported in Table 
3. For the three CRT-questions, the mean time used for 
the open format was 186 seconds vs. 108 seconds for the 
multiple-choice format.    
In the first two studies 49% were male and 51% 
female, in the third study 50% male and 50% female.  
 
Table 1. The age profile of the participants and 










Study1 2% 17% 22% 22% 21% 17% 
Study2  8% 21% 16% 18% 20% 18% 
Study3  9% 21% 18% 19% 18% 15% 






18 69 43.9 14.1 0.01 -1.05 
Age 
Study2  
16 69 42.0 15.7 -0.02 -1.32 
Age 
Study3  
16 69 41.8 15.5 0.11 -1.18 
CRT, 
Study1  
0 3 1.25 1.76 0.30 -1.42 
CRT; 
Study2 
0 3 0.97 0.72 -0.01 -1.54 
CRT; 
Study3 
0 3 0.53 0.90 1.56 1.21 
 
Table 1 shows that, persons of ages above 19 years were 
uniformly represented in our three samples. Skewness 
and Kurtosis are descriptive statistics for distribution. 
Skewness represents the extent to which scores have a 
tendency toward the upper or lower end of a 
distribution, while kurtosis indicates the extent to which 
a distribution of scores is relatively flat or relatively 
peaked. If the result is greater than +/- 2.0, the variable 
has a skewness problem. This is not the case for our 
studies, see Table 1.  
 
In Table 2 we present the educational profile of the 
participants.   
 
Table 2. Participants’ educational profile. 
(Number of respondents in the parenthesis in 














7% 35% 38% 20% 
Study2 
(1405)  
18% 36% 30% 17% 
Study3 
(1290) 
13% 42% 29% 17% 
 
The three measures used in the studies were the 
Cognitive Reflection Test, the three items developed by 
Frederick [7], a self-reported measure on phishing 
similar to the measurement used in the Eurostat-survey 
[28], and a behavioral measure on disclosure of personal 
data and demographics. The three CRT-items are often 
referred to as the bat/ball, widgets and the lilypad 
problem [13]. The open format, where the respondents 
fill in the answers themselves, is the standard CRT 
format. Recently a multiple-choice format has been 
developed. The motivation for using a multiple-choice 
format, using typical answers from studies with the open 
format, has been to save time for the respondents [30]. 
Table 3 presents the share of the respondents with all 
wrong answers, one correct, two correct and all three 
correct. 
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Table 3. The three CRT-items (Number of 










Study 1, open 
question  
38% 21% 20% 22% 
Study 2, open and 
multiple choice 
43% 29% 16% 12% 
Study 3, open and 
multiple choice  
69% 15% 10% 6% 
 
The context for our experiment on disclosure of 
personal data was that the participants in both studies 
had taken part in surveys before as panel members. The 
market research company has the answers to these 
surveys in their database but will normally not share this 
information with other clients. However, it is possible to 
link data and build a very detailed profile of each 
respondent based on answers to previous surveys. This 
was the context for our experiment on disclosure of 
personal data. We asked, in cooperation with the market 
research company, if we could have access to their 
answers to previous surveys and their Facebook profiles 
and with all these data build new profiles of them. The 
market research company, the data-processor, did not 
the share the personal data with us as client.  
Both studies used two questions from the Eurostat-
survey about credit cards and misuse of data. The 
formulation of these questions was discussed with the 
national bureau of statistics. In these questions, the word 
phishing is not used. Phishing is a term known in 
technological contexts, but its meaning is not known to 
all citizens. We performed a preliminary analysis of the 
understanding of the term. We used the question “can 
you, in your own words, describe was phishing is?” Of 
the respondents, 64% did not write anything, 23% wrote 
an explanation that we coded as correct, and 12% an 
explanation that we coded as incorrect. The two 
questions in the Eurostat-survey do not use the word 
phishing, but misuse and theft, see Table 4.  
Self-reports on phishing and phishing incidents can 
be criticized. How accurate are these type of data? 
Greitzer et al. 2021 [43] did a large scale simulated 
phishing experiment with 6938 faculty and staff 
members of an American university. They write (p. 36): 
“In summary, our results suggest that, among numerous 
variables studied in this experiment, the best predictor 
of phishing susceptibility is having been phished before. 
Individuals who report having been successfully 
phished in the last 2 months are more likely to succumb 
to one or more of our phishing emails.”  
In the following we refer to phishing, those who have 
and those how have not fallen for phishes, based on the 
answers to these two questions. 
Table 4. Credit-card misuse and ID-theft 
 Has experienced 
misused of credit or 
debit card, the last 12 
months  
Has not experienced 
misused of credit or 











 Has experienced ID 
theft the last 12 months  
Has not experienced ID 










 Has experienced 
misused of credit or 
debit card or ID-theft 
Has experienced 
misused of credit or 











Table 4 shows that around 10 percent of participants 
reported that they have experienced misuse, which is 
similar to the numbers reported in the Eurostat-surveys. 
Table 5 presents the share of the respondents with all 
wrong answers, one correct, two correct and all three 
correct for the four educational groups. 
 










Study 1 Primary 
education (84) 




48% 22% 17% 13% 
Page 7715
Study 1 Univ. & 
college, lower 
level (432) 
32% 23% 23% 22% 
Study 1 Univ. & 
college, higher 
level (234) 
24% 16% 20% 40% 
 
Study 2 Primary 
education (246) 




49% 28% 16% 8% 
Study 2 Univ. & 
college, lower 
level (413) 
40% 31% 15% 14% 
Study 2 Univ. & 
college, higher 
level (244) 
32% 27% 18% 23% 
     
Study 3 Primary 
education (163) 




71% 17% 9% 4% 
Study 3 Univ. & 
college, lower 
level (372) 
67% 13% 11% 9% 
Study 3 Univ. & 
college, higher 
level (214) 
64% 13% 14% 9% 
 
 
3.1. Hypotheses – Sharing of Data and the CRT 
as a Predictor of Susceptibility 
 
A low score on the cognitive reflection test indicates a 
tendency towards intuitive decision-making [8], [13].  
Jones et al. [32], in their phishing study, found that 
performance on CRT predicted susceptibility to 
phishing. We hypothesized that education and CRT are 
predictors of falling for phishes as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Education is a predictor of susceptibility 
to phishing. In comparison to those with low education, 
those with high education are less susceptible. 
 
There are many studies documenting that it is hard to 
detect phishing. Based on this we formulated the second 
hypothesis stating that an intuitive decision-making 
style measured with the CRT can predict falling for 
phishing.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The CRT is a predictor of susceptibility 
to phishing. In comparison to those with a low score on 
the CRT, those with high score on the CRT are less 
susceptible to phishing. 
 
Previous research has shown that females generally 
score lower on the CRT scores [7], [18] and so we 
expect them also to be more susceptible to phishing. 
However, studies on susceptibility to phishing did not 
find an effect of gender [32], [33]. Studies have 
indicated that in some situations, men take more risks 
than women [34].  
 
Hypothesis 3: Gender is a predictor of susceptibility to 
phishing. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Willingness to share personal data is a 




    To test our hypotheses, we chose binary logistic 
regression with a dichotomous variable, ‘has fallen for 
phish (yes/no)’, as the dependent variable. One of the 
purposes was to investigate the question: is CRT score 
a good predictor of falling for phishing when we include 
the other factors gender, age, education and disclosure 
of data as variables?    
Binary logistic regression is a form of regression 
used when the dependent variable is a dichotomy and 
the independent variables are of any type. It can be used 
to predict a categorical dependent variable on the basis 
of continuous and/or categorical independent variables, 
in our case whether or not someone reports that they has 
fallen for phishing in the past. By this method, the model 
is used for the prediction of the probability of the 
occurrence of the event by fitting data to a logistic curve. 
Cases with probabilities above a given numerical cut-off 
are accepted. We chose 0.12, 01.5 and 0.14 based on the 
percentages for falling for phish in the three datasets, see 
Table 4. The binary logistic, with the chosen cut-offs 1 
is categorised as success whereas cases lower than this 
cut off value are classified as 0 (failure). This method is 
used to test the null hypothesis that a linear relationship 
does not exist between the predictor variables and the 
log odds of the criterion variable. Goodness-of-fit tests, 
such as the likelihood ratio test, are available as 
indicators of model appropriateness, as is the Wald 
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statistic to test the significance of individual 
independent variables. 
We tested our models with the SPSS-software, 
version 27. In logistic regression models, the Hosmer-
Lemeshow test [35]. Archer et al. [36] is a goodness of 
fit test. Hosmer and Lemeshow recommend sample 
sizes greater than 400. A Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic of 
> 0.05 is often used to reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no difference, implying that the model's 
estimates fit the data.  
Of our two models (Table 6) the first has p-value 
smaller than 0.05 and the second and third p-value larger 
than 0.05. The Nagelkerke R2 is a pseudo R-square and 
it is impacted by how lopsided the split of dependent 
variables is. Even so it is often used to assess model 
adequacy [35]. The Nagelkerke R2 was 13.3% for study 
1, 19.6% for study 2 and 10.9% in study 3. Misuse of 
credit-card and ID theft were coded as one binary 
variable, see Table 4. 
In the binary logistic model, we included gender, 
age, education, the CRT scores and the behavioral 
measure of data disclosure as variables. Table 5 shows 
that it was those with the longest education that 
performed best on the CRT-test. Since it has been shown 
that those with good mathematical skills or cognitive 
abilities often perform better on the CRT, we included 
an interaction effect of CRT and education in the model. 
 
Table 6 - Overall fitting indices for the binary 
logistics regression model.  
Model summary – study 1 (N=1148) 




Step 3 777.294 0.063 0.121 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Chi-square df. Sig. 
Step 3 19.875 8 0.011 
Model summary – study 2 (N=1404) 




Step 3 1043.91 0.089 0.157 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Chi-square df. Sig. 
Step 3 9.566 8 0.297 
Model summary – study 3 (N=1290) 




Step 3 955.648 0.060 0.109 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Chi-square df. Sig. 
Step 3 7.865 8 0.447 
 
The R squares indicated that the variables in the 
equation contributed to predicting the dependent 
variable falling for phishing.  
We used the Wald statistic to identify the significant 
variables in the model. The Wald statistic is the square 
of the t-statistic and gives equivalent results for a single 
parameter and can be used to test the significance of 
particular predictors in a statistical model. As the 
method for selecting how independent variables are 
entered into the analysis, we choice backward Wald. 
The method analyzes the predictor variables and picks 
the one that predicts the most on the dependent measure. 
In the backward method, all the predictor variables 
chosen are added into the model. Then, the variables that 
do not (significantly) predict anything on the dependent 
measure are removed from the model one by one. The 
backward method is generally the preferred method 
because the forward method might produce so-called 
suppressor effects. These suppressor effects occur when 
predictors are only significant when another predictor is 
held constant.  
 










Study 1 - Step 3 
Male=1 
Female=0 
-0.407 0,19 4.49 1 0.03 1.50 




-0.711 0.19 13.46 1 0.00 0.49 
CRT -0.383 0.09 18.29 1 0.00 0.68 
Constant 0.270 0.32 0.73 1 0.39 1.31 
Study 2 – Step 3 
Male=1 
Female=0 
0.385 0.17 5.42 1 0.00 1.47 





-1.406 0.18 64.70 1 0.00 0.25 
CRT -0.288 0.09 10.99 1 0.00 0.75 
Constant 0.446 0.28 2,63 1 0.11 1.56 







Education 0.191 0.92 4,272 1 0,04 1.21 




-1.085 0.17 41.267 1 0.00 0.34 
CRT -0.283 0.12 5.868 1 0.02 0.75 
Constant -0.335 0.33 1.029 1 0.31 0.72 
 
   Education, and the interaction term education x CRT, 
are not variables in the equation for study 1 and 2 see 
Table 8. For study 3, gender is not a variable in the 
equation. In the final model in step 3 for study 1 and 2 
(see Table 7) data-disclosure, CRT score and age all had 
high Wald estimates indicating that they made the 
biggest contribution to the model; that is, they are 
predictors for our outcome variable, falling for phishes. 
In study 3, data-disclosure and age are the two factors 
with high Wald estimates – see Table 7. 
 
Table 8. Variables not in the equation  
 Score df Sig. 
Study 1 – Step 3 
 Education x CRT 0.323 1 0.570 
 Education 0.203 1 0.652 
 Overall statistics 0.327 2 0.849 
Study 2 – Step 3 
 Education x CRT 0.047 1 0.829 
 Education 0.011 1 0.916 
 Overall statistics 0.417 2 0.812 
Study 3 – Step 3 
 Male 1 
Female 0 
0.937 1 0.33 
 Education x CRT 0.075 1 0.784 
 Overall statistics 1.008 2 0.604 
 
The Wald statistic estimates indicated that data 
disclosure behaviour, CRT scores and age were 
predictors of falling for phishing. In our model, see 
Table 7 (that included other variables), education was 
not a predictor of falling for phish in study 1 and 2, and 
a very weak predictor in study 3. Out conclusion is that 
hypothesis 1 was rejected. The second hypothesis was 
supported; in all three studies, CRT score was a 
predictor of falling for phish. The third hypothesis was 
partly supported; in the first two studies, the Wald 
estimates indicated a gender difference, with men being 
more susceptible to falling for phish than women. 
Hypothesis 4, willingness to share personal data, was 
supported. The respondents that gave consent seems 
more susceptibility to phishing than those that did not. 
 
6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
Our results confirmed the potential of using the CRT 
as a test for the likelihood of a person’s susceptibility to 
phishing as reported by the citizens. The CRT provides 
a useful tool for identifying one of the characteristics of 
people who would benefit from advice or tuition to help 
avoid falling for these damaging confidence tricks. 
Willingness to share data was also associated with 
susceptibility to phishing. 
Our findings indicate that the CRT can be used with 
samples drawn from a national population. CRT has 
been developed and validated with student samples and 
very few studies have used the CRT with ordinary 
citizens, as we did in the present studies. When a 
convenience sample is used, it may not be representative 
of the population at large so that the results are of limited 
generalizability. National studies might serve as a 
reference for other studies. This is also why we 
cooperated with the national bureau of statistics on the 
wording of the questionnaire.  
However, it is much harder to design experiments 
with national samples, since the participants are not in a 
controlled environment. The time-factor plays a role in 
conjunction with the difficulty of the tasks. When a task 
takes many minutes, some participants will abandon it. 
Those with less education and other groups such as the 
elderly might behave differently from students. These 
can be recruited in a national sample. This is one of the 
reasons why the recommendation is that researchers 
should also use these samples. There are also ethical 
issues that are more challenging in uncontrolled 
environments, such as the issue of informed consent. 
There is also the issue of the expectations of the survey 
participants. They are used to answering questions, and 
less used to doing tasks and being tested in a study that 
includes the CRT problems. Some market research 
companies might hesitate to carry out studies that could 
attract complaints and negative publicity. 
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In the USA and some other English-speaking 
countries, the CRT is quite well known. If a respondent 
knows the correct answer in advance, the CRT cannot 
be used as intended. This is one of the reasons why 
alternatives to the standard CRT have been developed, 
tested and used in some recent studies [37]. In non-
English speaking countries, such as the country of this 
study, Norway, it has rarely been used, so that it is 
unlikely that respondents will know the answers 
already. Others have studied the repeated exposure 
effect of the CRT and concluded that the CRT is robust 
to multiple testing and is stable across time [42].    
However, if someone performs an online search, he or 
she will be able to find the correct answers easily.  
The present results demonstrate that those with more 
education perform significantly better than others on the 
CRT. One of the strengths of using the CRT is that it is 
not a self-reported measurement but rather, assuming 
that the respondent does not search for the answer (or 
know the answer in advance), tells us about the 
respondent’s individual behavior and characteristics. 
Our study indicates that individual citizens can perform 
well on the CRT without higher education. In our 
logistics models that included demographics, a measure 
on data-sharing and the CRT, it was the data-sharing 
behavior and the CRT that contributed significantly to 
predicting susceptibility to phishing, not demographics. 
Sirota & Juanchich [38] argue that the standard open 
format should be replaced by a multiple-choice format 
because it is less likely that someone will perform a 
search to find the answer; instead the respondent will 
give a spontaneous response. However, the comparison 
we did of the two formats in the study indicated that, 
including for the multiple-choice format, some users 
took a very long time to answer the three questions. For 
the three CRT questions the mean completion time was 
186 seconds for the open format vs 108 for the multiple-
choice format. A solution would be to use a timer. After 
x seconds, the next section or question is presented, and 
in the case of no answer being given this will be 
recorded as a no answer or a wrong answer. This 
approach was used by Da Silva et al. [39] and should be 
considered for future studies with the CRT. 
It is important to mention that we do not know that 
the respondents reported honestly when they answered 
the questions and that we actually know whether they 
have actually fallen for phishing or not. We speculate 
that some that spent long times on the CRT questions 
had searched for the answers online. In a controlled 
laboratory setting it is less likely that this will happen. 
When a respondent is answering a survey on his or her 
PC or smartphone, he or she may be distracted and may 
not really care much about the questions and the answers 
given [40]. In a lab., a class-room or other controlled 
environment this is less of a problem. Another drawback 
of large-scale surveys is that it is costly to recruit many 
respondents and run a large-scale study in a population.  
The CRT is useful for research on why online users 
fall for phishing but is not the only measure that can be 
recommended. We opted for a measure on data 
disclosure in our studies to complement CRT, as well as 
demographics. For future research, we suggest that the 
CRT should be used in actual or semi-natural phishing 
experiments, together with other measurements of risk 
propensity [41] inattention, optimism bias or 
overconfidence.     
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